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Abstract 
This paper will discuss the emerging application of electrical machines and drives within the aerospace sector.  
The reasons for the implementation of electrical systems in aircraft will be considered, and the necessity for 
fault tolerance discussed. 
 
1. Introduction 
An aircraft is a self contained system using fuel to 
provide propulsion and generate all secondary 
power.  Secondary power is electric, hydraulic, 
pneumatic and mechanical and is used in a plethora 
of secondary systems.  In modern aircraft the 
secondary systems are broadly split into five 
categories; flight control, environmental control, 
anti-icing, galley load and miscellaneous loads [1]. 
Early aircraft were of such a size that flight control 
secondary systems could be powered manually, a 
good example being the direct connection between 
the flight control surfaces via rods and cables to the 
control yoke.   As the size and speed of aircraft 
increased it became necessary for many secondary 
systems to have some form of power assistance.  
During the early use of assisted power there was 
much debate over the power source for each of the 
secondary systems, but over time the various 
aerospace manufacturers converged, as summarised 
in table 1. 
 
Table 1.  The five main aircraft systems and their power sources. 
Aircraft system Power source 
Flight controls Hydraulic 
Environmental control Pneumatic 
Anti-icing Pneumatic 
Galley loads Electric 
Miscellaneous Hydraulic 
Much research has been carried out on replacing 
the three individually optimised power systems 
with one globally optimised electrical power 
system. It is a commonly held view that this will 
not only result in less scheduled maintenance, 
Oman [2], but also a reduction in weight and fuel 
consumption.  Indeed the 1985 NASA case study 
based an all-electric version of the Boeing 767, 
indicated a weight saving of 10% and a similar 
reduction in fuel consumption [1].   
Such an improvement is in line with current 
industrial (and political) thinking, and the recent 
advances in permanent magnet and power 
electronic technologies make all-electric systems 
technologically and financially feasible.   
The ‘all-electric’ aircraft, that is all secondary 
power being electrical, requires a total redesign, 
replacing all pneumatic and hydraulic systems with 
electrical systems in one step.  Such a move is not 
without significant commercial and safety risks and 
would never ‘get off the ground’ as far as 
certification is concerned.  It is for this reason that 
the aerospace industry prefers the more-electric 
aircraft (MEA) approach, a progressive program in 
which new electrical systems are adopted one by 
one, whilst retaining some degree of the original 
pneumatic or hydraulic system as a backup.  As 
time passes, trust in the new electrical systems will 
grow, facilitating the removal of the non-electric 
systems.  Once this stage is reached the tried and 
tested electrical systems can then be used in a 
totally redesigned all-electric aircraft.  The current 
aircraft systems, 
, 
can be compared to the proposed all-electric 
aircraft systems in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte 
nicht gefunden werden..  
The A380 has demonstrated more-electric 
technologies including electro-hydrostatic actuators 
for flight control surfaces. These are hydraulic in 
operation but fed from an electrical supply rather 
than a hydraulic network – an inbuilt electrical 
pump and reservoir pressurises the actuator [3]. 
 
Figure 1.  Current aircraft power distribution systems. 
 
Figure 2.  Proposed all-electric aircraft power generation. 
2. Examples of fault tolerance 
There is always a combination of faults which will 
lead to the failure of a system, the task of the 
engineer is to overcome or manage the likely faults 
and thus provide a system which is predictable and 
sufficiently reliable, with scheduled servicing. 
For any safety critical system the development of 
an uncontrolled fault may risk property, life and 
limb: the response to a fault should fall into one of 
three categories; 
A.  Benign failure 
Mellor et al. [4] describe an electrically powered 
vehicle traction drive designed to fail in a benign 
manner, where a fault may damage a single 
module, but is contained.  This allows the driver to 
manoeuvre to a safe position with full use of 
steering, braking and other necessary systems and 
makes economic repair possible. 
B.  Continuous operation with reduced 
output 
In his paper on the design of telecommunication 
systems, White [5] discusses the desired response 
of a network server in the event of a fault.  Total 
failure could lead to an entire corporation grinding 
to a halt until the problem is fixed.  However by 
partitioning the system, the fault is limited to only a 
few users. 
C.  Continuous operation with full output 
Aircraft primary flight control surfaces such as 
rudders, elevators and ailerons must maintain 
operation following actuator, power supply or 
control signal failure, so parallel arrangements of 
actuators are typically employed to ensure full 
operation in the event of any single or even double 
failure.  
An often cited analogy is the spectrum used by 
White [5] and shown in Figure 3.  A system which 
gives some protection against the most common 
faults lies to the left, whereas a system designed to 
overcome all conceivable faults and combinations 
of faults lies to the right.  Increased fault tolerance 
equals increased complexity and cost.  
 
Figure 3.  White’s spectrum of availability [5] 
The reliability of a system is defied by the 
standards applicable to the application and may be 
measured in a number of ways, as described by 
Caplin [6].  For a relatively flight critical system 
such as an aircraft engine fuel pump, the following 
reliability standards must be met, Mecrow et al. 
[7]; 
• There must be no single fault which causes a 
hazardous failure. 
• Any fault which will cause an in flight 
shutdown must have a failure rate of less than 
10-7 failures per hour. 
• Undetectable faults which could, in 
combination with a subsequent fault, cause an 
in flight shut down, must have a failure rate of 
less than 10-8 failures per hour. 
These levels of reliability are virtually impossible 
to achieve with a standard system and as such, 
flight critical systems have evolved to be fault 
tolerant by a variety of methods. 
3. What is ‘fault tolerance’? 
For a system to be fault tolerant, White [5] states 
that: “no single failure will cause the system to 
malfunction”. The level of fault tolerance is 
dependent on the severity of the application, 
however, for a system to be fault tolerant four 
principles must be met; 
A.  Partitioning and redundancy 
A fault must be limited to a single component or 
sub-system. Jahns [8] introduced the concept of 
partitioning a 370kW AC drive so each phase of 
the motor is isolated and connected to a separate 
drive.  In the event of a fault, the fault is contained 
to a single phase ensuring continued, albeit 
reduced, output.  This method results in a 
statistically more reliable system, as modules are 
not interdependent.   
Where a drop in performance is unacceptable, 
redundancy is required.  This may involve a spare 
module, in use only during a fault, or the overrating 
of all modules so in the event of a fault, the healthy 
modules are capable of providing an increased 
output.  Redundancy comes at a cost, as more 
components are required and overrating means 
extra capacity that is not normally in use.  Welchko 
et al. [9] apply a “silicon overrating cost factor 
(SOCF)” to a number of fault tolerant drive 
strategies.  The standard 3-phase AC drive, as 
shown later in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte 
nicht gefunden werden., has a SOCF of 1, 
whereas the fault tolerant drives considered in the 
paper have a SOCF ranging between 1.15 and 2.24  
with the general rule that the higher the cost, the 
greater the fault tolerance. 
B.  Fault isolation 
Partitioning alone is not sufficient, as certain types 
of fault will propagate throughout the system, 
affecting previously healthy modules.  Isolation 
may be through a simple fuse or switch, or 
managed by a complex control system. 
C.  Fault detection and annunciation 
Fault isolation generally requires detection. For 
electric motors,  Nandi and Toliyat review the fault 
detection methods available [10].  Methods ranging 
from signal based to infra-red monitoring and 
chemical detection are considered.  A versatile 
method, capable of detecting a variety of faults, 
both mechanical and electrical, uses continuous 
harmonic analysis of a line voltage, current or other 
signal.  Changes to the system are detected by an 
alteration of the harmonic spectrum. This harmonic 
signature indicates the type of fault and may be 
used to predict a slowly developing fault, allowing 
remedial action to be taken. 
D.  Online repair  
Certain systems should not be shutdown for 
servicing or repair, an example may be a safety 
system in a nuclear power plant.  In the event of a 
fault, the faulted module should be removed 
without a halt in operation. 
An alternative is to overcome a fault using a 
different control strategy.  Wallace and Spee [11] 
postulate a number of failure symptoms and 
remedial control strategies for a brushless DC 
drive.  With suitable drive technology and fault 
detection a highly available fault tolerant system 
can be developed. 
4. Considerations in fault 
tolerant drives 
The most important decision to be made in the 
design of a fault tolerant drive is the type of 
machine, as each machine has its own 
characteristics, which make it more or less fault 
tolerant and this has an impact upon the topology 
of the electrical drive. The power density of each 
machine type will also vary and weight is an 
important consideration in aerospace. 
A.  Brushed machines 
Wound field machines only offer power density 
advantages at very high power levels, hence their 
use in power generation. At aerospace power levels 
these machines are larger and less efficient than 
their counterparts. There is the additional set of 
failure possibilities associated with the brushes, and 
electrical arcing is most definitely not suited to an 
aerospace application in which the air pressure can 
be very low. 
B.  Synchronous reluctance machines 
These benefit from a rugged rotor, however the 
overlapping winding mean that there is mutual 
coupling between phases and thermal overload is 
likely to affect more than one phase. Fault 
tolerance is possible by using groups of isolated 
phases; however this comes at the cost of a much 
larger machine. 
C.  Induction machines 
As with the synchronous reluctance machines, the 
induction machine (IM) benefits from a simple 
rotor, however this requires careful design to avoid 
failure due to differential thermal expansion of the 
rotor bars and rotor laminations. Mutual coupling 
between phases and between the rotor and phases 
mean fault tolerance with complete magnetic and 
thermal isolation is only possible if a series of 
separate IMs are used. 
D.  Switched reluctance machines 
SRMs are a natural candidate for fault tolerance 
and much work has been done by Richter et. Al. 
[12-14].  The rotor is robust and will withstand 
large mechanical and thermal stresses. The phases 
are decoupled electrically and mechanically, but 
only slightly coupled thermally and magnetically – 
a problem that can be overcome by the use of a 
spacer tooth between phase windings. 
E.  Permanent magnet synchronous 
machines 
While considered the most power dense at lower 
power levels, PMSMs have a number of 
disadvantages over SRMs.  Their magnets make for 
a mechanically challenging design and place limits 
on the thermal capability of the machine.  More 
notably, the rotor field will drive a current in an 
armature winding, even in the event of a power 
converter or winding fault. In the case of a winding 
or power device short-circuit, this can result in 
additional damage, including excessive heating of 
the motor windings. 
However, it has been shown [15-17] that these 
problems can be overcome with careful mechanical 
and thermal design, fault detection and appropriate 
drive response. In particular, a high per unit 
reactance in the motor will limit fault currents in 
shorted armature turns by the remedial application 
of a terminal short-circuit by the control 
electronics. This will induce a drag torque which 
must be overcome by the remaining active phases, 
but despite this, a well designed  PMSM is 
considered to be the smallest and most efficient 
machine topology, a definite attraction for 
aerospace applications. 
F.  Considerations for the electric drive 
Phase isolation must continue back to the electrical 
drive through the use of isolated modules.  These 
may take the form of a set of isolated H bridges 
each supplying a single isolated winding, or a 
multiple set of three phase drives supplying 
multiple isolated sets of three phase windings. It is 
necessary to employ independent control 
electronics for each module and, unless the 
reliability can be assumed far in excess of the drive, 
independent power supplies and control signals to 
each module. A fully independent drive 
configuration is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Dual three-phase electric drive. 
The drive must rapidly detect a power device or 
motor winding fault and act accordingly (within a 
PWM cycle) to avoid the fault propagating through 
the power devices. 
Appropriate actions [18-19] may be complete 
disconnection of the faulted phase from the DC 
supply, open circuiting the faulted phase in the case 
of an open circuit fault, or short circuiting the phase 
in the case of a turn-turn short.  In addition the 
drive may need to be capable of supplying a shaped 
current to the remaining healthy phases to 
overcome any alteration to the quality of the output 
torque [20]. 
5. Recent Fault tolerant drive 
applications 
Below are a few examples of these fault tolerant 
principles applied to electrical drives for aerospace 
applications carried out by the authors. 
A.  Prototype Electrical Actuator for 
Aircraft Flaps and Slats. 
Aircraft wing surfaces consist of a system of flaps 
and slats.  The controlled position of the flaps is not 
flight critical, however ensuring their symmetry 
across both wings is.  The current system uses two 
hydraulic motors, mechanically summed via a shaft 
running the length of the wing span, and connected 
to two separate hydraulic supplies with an electrical 
pump to pressurise each hydraulic system.  The 
relative position of all flaps is monitored (to 
maintain symmetry), and any small amount of 
asymmetry will result in the system locking all 
flaps in position, likewise if the pump system fails. 
An electrical version of the flap actuation system 
was sought [21] in which the conventional system 
of a centralised dual hydraulic motor and drive 
shaft across the wing span, is replaced with an 
individual actuator at each flap surface.  Such an 
approach would give greater functionality 
(independent flap control which may be 
aerodynamically desirable), reduced maintenance  
(due the removal of hydraulics) and most 
importantly, a reduction in mass due to the removal 
of the shafting, hydraulics and all associated 
ancillaries such as torque limiters and pipework. 
Although the flaps may be locked in the event of a 
failure, failure may require an emergency landing 
and trade studies showed a level of fault tolerance 
is required in the actuator electronics to ensure this 
has a 10-5 per flight hour probability of occurring. 
    1)  Choice of drive 
The choice of motor type was between SRM and 
PMSM. With the actuator motors requiring rated 
torque at all angles in the event of a fault, the 
PMSM was felt to offer the simplest solution.  In 
addition the PM machine offered the highest power 
density at the ~2kW level – important, given the 
limited space available for the system and the 
multiple number of actuators. 
A number of power electronic and motor phase 
fault tolerant topologies were assessed with two 
basic types of motor topology identified – multiple 
single phase drives and multiple three-phase drives, 
described as; 
• n+1 phase drives (eg. 2+1, 3+1 etc.) 
• 3n+3 phase drives (eg. 3+3, 2×3+3 etc.) 
In all cases the performance, component count, 
reliability and mass of each topology were 
considered and the worst case from high and low 
speed operation.  The result, shown in Figure 5, 
suggests that a 2+1 or 4+1 topology, supplied from 
single phase bridges, provides the best combination 
of component count, converter size and machine 
size. For the flap actuator a 2+1 was deemed the 
optimum choice for the lower complexity, 
including a requirement for only 3 power supplies 
and sets of control electronics. 
 
Figure 5: Fault tolerant drive sizes and complexity. 
    2)  Prototype actuator system 
The system specification is based on that used in a 
mid-sized commercial aircraft. The aircraft has two 
flaps per wing and a maximum load per flap of 
34kNm.  The flaps must be synchronised to within 
0.25% of their full travel when retracted and 0.5% 
at all other times.  Any asymmetry exceeding these 
limits may result in an uncontrollable roll of the 
aircraft so a mean time between failures of 10-9 
failures per flight hour is specified (less than once 
every 100,000 years).  This is considerably more 
than the 10-5 specified for loss of operation, 
however fail-safe power-off brakes can be used to 
lock the system to avoid any excessive asymmetry, 
a technique employed in conventional flaps. The 
three sets of control electronics in each flap 
actuator and a three-lane flap control computer are 
sufficient to monitor flap position sensors and 
guarantee shutdown of the system in a severe 
failure or asymmetry. 
The electric actuator is designed to deliver 3.4Nm 
at 10,000rpm into an inbuilt 37:1 gearbox and then 
to a conventional flap gearbox (already integral on 
a rotary flap system).  A permanent magnet fault 
tolerant motor was designed with a 2+1 phase 
topology and fault-tolerant characteristics.  This 
motor can deliver full torque with 2 out of 3 phase 
operational, and the magnetic design ensures that 
each phase is thermally, magnetically and 
mechanically isolated. This phase isolation is 
maintained by the three converters . 
A full scale demonstrator has been built and tested, 
featuring two flaps actuators.  This was shown to 
operate with a variety of faulted conditions at a 
motor drive and actuator level and to meet 
symmetry requirements.  The actuator test-rig is 
shown in figure 6 and the reshaping of current 
waveforms when operating on two out of three 
phases to reduce output torque ripple is shown in 
Figure 7.  
 
Figure 6: DEAWS flap actuator test rig. 
 
Figure 7: Reshaping of waveforms to reduce torque ripple. 
B.  High power fault tolerant machine 
design 
Aircraft fuel pumps are conventionally a 
mechanical pump, coupled to an engine output 
shaft via a gearbox. 
The benefits of an electric fuel pump are the 
removal of the mechanical gearbox (less 
maintenance and the removal of equipment from 
the space-limited engine region) and independence 
between the speed (hence fuel flow rate) of the fuel 
pump and the speed of the engine allowing the fuel 
delivery to be matched precisely to the engine 
conditions. 
An aircraft fuel pump has strict reliability 
requirements so an electrical alternative must be 
fault tolerant. 
A fault tolerant prototype has been built and tested 
by the authors [23].  The machine has a 
specification of 100kW at 30,000rpm.  To produce 
the most power dense machine possible a fuel 
cooled PMSM was used.  Fuel cooling allows for 
current densities in excess of 20A/mm2 without 
overheating. 
The motor is a multiple single-phase design, with 4 
concentrated windings isolated mechanically, 
thermally and magnetically, as shown in Figure 8 . 
 
Figure 8.  100kW Fault tolerant four phase PMSM stator. 
Fault tolerance is via a 3+1 topology, i.e. the 4 
phase machine can operate to meet specification 
with only 3 phases working.  Electrical isolation at 
the power electronics level is maintained through 
the use of four independent phase modules. 
This 3+1 topology implies an over-rating of 33% 
on the motor phases and the converter, i.e. under 
normal conditions each phase delivers 25kW, rising 
to 33kW under faulted conditions.  
The high power level demanded a great deal of 
design effort into avoiding excessive losses.  Due 
to the high speed of the rotor an Inconel retaining 
sleeve was required to hold the samarium cobalt 
magnets in place. This electrically conducting 
sleeve and magnet arrangement is very susceptible 
to induced eddy currents and their associated 
losses. 
The concentrated winding arrangement results in a 
high degree of non-synchronous airgap magnetic 
fields. A great deal of effort went into the 
electromagnetic design of the stator to diminish 
these, with the result of a reduction in rotor loss of 
29% [24]. 
C.  A Prototype Electric Landing Gear 
Nose Wheel Steering System 
Aircraft landing gear is currently hydraulically 
powered.  This poses a fire risk as the hydraulic 
fluid is in close proximity with the brakes, to 
mitigate this problem there is a minimum turn-
around time after landing in order for the brakes to 
cool sufficiently before takeoff again. 
The elimination of this risk would be beneficial to 
the safety of the aircraft and also to the airline in 
terms of a faster turn-around. 
A research project looked at replacing the 
hydraulically actuated nose wheel steering system 
with an electrical system.  The safety requirements 
for the steering system are less than the 
aforementioned flap system and fuel pump, 
although operation must be possible following any 
single electrical fault. In addition the system must 
be able to be “free to castor” in the event of a 
serious failure or when landing or taking off. In 
‘free to castor’, control of the steering is removed 
and natural corrective forces on the wheels keep the 
wheels straight on the runway. 
The drive employed a dual lane electric drive and a 
dual 3-phase motor.  The system operates in an 
active-active configuration with both drives 
simultaneously on, requiring that both control lanes 
are in agreement for position demands, position 
feedback and motor torque.  In the event of a single 
electrical fault, the system can operate in active-
standby configuration, disabling the failed lane and 
operating from its own position sensors. In the 
event of a disagreement both lanes will disable, a 
power-off clutch will allow ‘free to castor’ and the 
pilot or steering control computer can elect to 
operate the drive from either lane, with the aid of 
fault signals. Figure 9 shows the prototype actuator. 
The electric motor is housed at the top of the 
actuator, resulting in considerably lower forces on 
the extension and retraction mechanism than 
conventional hydraulic nose wheel steering.  
 
Figure 9: Electric nose wheel steering actuator. 
6. Conclusions 
Considerable research has been undertaken in the 
drive towards an all-electric aircraft. This paper 
details some of the systems investigated by the 
authors. Fault-tolerance is crucial in attaining the 
safety requirements for aerospace components, and 
the prototype systems described can be shown to 
attain aerospace safety requirements in their 
suggested applications.   
Throughout the prototype systems discussed, the 
principles of partitioning, isolation and redundancy 
have been applied to give fault tolerance.  For a 
truly fault tolerant system these design principles 
must be applied at the motor, converter and 
controller level. 
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